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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of partner selection in a virtual organisa-
tion (VO); speciﬁcally, we develop mixed integer linear programming (MILP) models
to support the conﬁguration of VOs in a virtual organisation breeding environment
(VBE). Apart from the basic model - which focuses on the minimisation of total ﬁxed
and variable costs - we present extensions which capture transportation costs, elabo-
rate alternative measures for capacity risk, and account for inter-organisational depen-
dencies due to an earlier collaboration history. Computational experiments suggest
that our MILP models are tractable for problems of reasonable size and consequently
potentially useful for VO decision making.
Keywords: partner selection, virtual organisation, breeding environment, multiple
criteria, mixed integer linear programming
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Collaborative network organisations (CNO) are ﬂexible as they can efﬁciently combine differ-
ent organisational competences. Indeed, for companies that have decided to concentrate on their
core competences, CNOs are imperative to the conduct of successful business activities. This
has motivated extensive research efforts into CNO related phenomena, most notably virtual or-
ganisations (VO) and virtual enterprises (VE) (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2005). Re-
cently, several researchers have introduced the idea of a ‘club’ that consists of a set of member-
organisations which have developed a mutually agreed cooperation structure for the creation of
temporary networked project organisations, namely VOs (Lau and Wong, 2001; Camarinha-Matos
and Afsarmanesh, 2003; Tølle and Bernus, 2003). In this paper we adopt the terminology of
Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh (2003), who call the club a virtual organisation breeding en-
vironment (VBE). The VBE structure includes, for instance, common ICT infrastructure, strategy,
and processes for agile VO creation.
In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting VO partners in a VBE. That is, when a VBE
identiﬁes a business opportunity, it needs to determine a ‘good’ VO conﬁguration through which
customer needs can be met. This is essentially an optimisation problem that can be formulated
as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model. It is in this spirit that we develop a model
for allocating work to potential VO partners, taking into account ﬁxed and variable work costs,
transportation costs, risks of capacity shortfall, and even inter-organisational dependencies which
derive from an earlier collaboration history.
Speciﬁcally, incontrasttoearliermodels, weexplicitlyconsidertheriskoffailuresinVOoperation
as well as the modelling of inter-organisational dependencies. Although these two aspects have
been recognised as relevant (e.g. Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2003; Fischer et al., 2004;
Talluri et al., 2006), they have not received attention by way of formal modelling. In the VO
partner selection problem, these aspects can be operationalised by formulating decision criteria
1which are used in conjunction with goal-programming techniques (e.g. Taha, 1997) or additive
value functions (MAVT, Keeney and Raiffa, 1993).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of earlier literature.
Section 3 describes the VBE-based VO creation process and illustrates it through a preliminary
example. Section4developstheMILPmodelforVOpartnerselection. Section5givesanumerical
example, and Section 6 discusses computational aspects and possible extensions of the model.
Section 7 concludes with suggestions for further research.
2 Related Research
2.1 Literature Review
The problem of partner selection has been addressed extensively in the context of supply chain
management (SCM). Thus, although the selection of suppliers in SCM differs somewhat from the
conﬁguration of VOs, results from the SCM literature do offer insights into VO selection. For ex-
ample, topics such as total cost of ownership (e.g. Ellram, 1995; Degraeve et al., 2000) and option
contracts (e.g. Kamrad and Siddique, 2004; Martínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi, 2005) have at-
tracted considerable interest in the SCM literature. Also recent advances in portfolio optimisation
(e.g. Gustafsson and Salo, 2005; Liesiö et al., 2005) are relevant to VO partner selection.
To-date, few studies have taken an optimisation-based approach to VO partner selection. Table 1
presents some examples which we discuss here in some detail. To begin with, Ko et al. (2001), Ip
et al. (2004), and Wu and Su (2005) present integer programming models where the objective is to
minimise total costs which, in turn, consist of production, operation, and transportation costs, for
instance. The models of Ko et al. (2001) and Ip et al. (2004) are solved using heuristic tabu search
2and the branch-and-bound algorithm, respectively. Wu and Su (2005) reformulate their model in
terms of a graph theoretic representation and develop an approximation algorithm, too.
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Feng and Yamashiro (2003) minimise a “comprehensive cost function” which is formed by adding
costs due processing activities, transportation, and earliness-and-tardiness. Speciﬁcally, they for-
mulate a mixed integer non-linear program which is solved only after the size of the model is re-
duced through qualitative pre-qualiﬁcation of candidate partners. Degraeve and Roodhooft (2000)
present another extensive cost-minimising model which is applied to the selection of suppliers.
Their MILP model minimises the sum of a various costs that are obtained from activity based cost-
ing (ABC, Cooper and Kaplan, 1988). They also develop a transparent cost-hierarchy and show
the relationship between ABC and total cost of ownership approaches.
However, it has been recognised that VO partner selection is essentially a multi-criteria decision-
making problem which involves several ‘soft’ factors - such as corporate culture and social rela-
tions - that cannot be readily captured by pure cost models (e.g. Talluri et al., 1999; Mikhailov,
2002). Further to this recognition, Mikhailov (2002), Boon and Sierksma (2003), and Sha and
Che (2005) present models with more general selection criteria. Mikhailov (2002) and Sha and
Che (2005) address multiple objectives with the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP, Saaty, 1980),
while Boon and Sierksma (2003) employ direct weighting of attributes. Mikhailov (2002), in turn,
develops a fuzzy programming method for incorporating uncertain attribute weights and candidate
scores into the AHP framework. Boon and Sierksma (2003) and Sha and Che (2005) develop in-
teger programming formulations for their problems and solve these using standard optimisation
approaches, such as branch-and-bound methods.
The AHP model of Fischer et al. (2004) accounts explicitly for inter-organisational dependencies
that need to be determined for a group of organisations. The optimisation problem in VO selection
3is formulated as that of ﬁnding the maximum weight path from a source to a drain in a digraph,
whereafter an Ant Colony Optimisation algorithm is employed to ﬁnd the optimal solution. The
goal-programming model of Talluri et al. (1999) also considers inter-organisational dependencies.
This model seeks to minimise 1) costs, 2) distances, and 3) inception time, and to maximise 4)
cultural compatibility. The number of candidates – and thus the size of the model – is reduced by
excluding inefﬁcient candidates. This makes the model computationally tractable.
Lin and Chen (2004) present a comprehensive list of 183 evaluation attributes for the selection of
supply alliances. They also develop a model for optimising the structure of the attribute-hierarchy
for speciﬁc situations. Although their decision-making model deals with the selection of an al-
liance that a single organisation could join, most attributes are applicable to VO partner selection
as well.
Hajidimitriou and Georgiou (2002) present a model for selecting partners in international joint
ventures. This model provides some support for risk management in that the minimisation of
proﬁt shortfall is treated as an explicit selection criterion. Ip et al. (2003) develop a model for
maximising the probability of success of a virtual enterprise. Because their model is neither linear
nor convex, they develop a genetic algorithm for solving it. The recent model of Talluri et al.
(2006) accommodates stochastic variability in partner performance attributes. They model the
problem through chance-constrained data envelopment analysis (Land et al., 1993) and compare
the results of their stochastic model to those of the deterministic one. In their example, stochastic
considerations are apparently important, because stochastic and deterministic models give quite
different results.
42.2 Conclusions from the Literature Review
In broad terms, earlier models for VO partner selection can be categorised either as (i) cost-
minimisations models or (ii) multi-criteria models. Advanced cost-minimisation models capture
a large variety of costs in the objective function and are therefore reasonably good on this point.
Multi-criteria models, in turn, capture several incommensurable attributes in addition to cost con-
siderations.
There are several topics of considerable practical relevance that have received little attention thus
far. First, hardly any multi-criteria models have been presented to deal with inter–organisational
dependencies – including considerations such as inter-organisational trust, cultural homogeneity,
and success of past collaboration – which contribute to the expected success of future collaboration
(Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2003). Such criteria must be considered for a group of or-
ganisations (as opposed to a single organisation), which results in more complex models (Fischer
et al., 2004). Second, few studies have addressed risk management issues in partner selection; yet,
the minimisation of risks related to capacity ﬂuctuations, quality failures, and ﬁnance, for instance,
can be viewed as highly relevant selection criteria.
In this setting, we develop a model which accounts for inter-organisational dependencies and ca-
pacity risks through the speciﬁcation of corresponding selection criteria. Another departure from
earlier models is that the amount of work that is allocated to partners can be a continuous quantity.
This is motivated by two practical reasons. First, partners are rarely selected according to the ﬁnal
project description: rather, at the outset of the VO creation process, the project description is ten-
tative so that it may be viable to allocate work on some tasks to several partners. Second, during
the VO creation, the project description and the proposed work allocation are iteratively reﬁned
until the project is ﬁnally started. These phenomena can be better addressed by using continuous
work-allocation variables rather than discrete “machine-job” variables.
53 Problem Description
3.1 Life-Cycle Phases of a VO
In general terms, the life cycle of a VO can be divided into three phases, namely 1) creation, 2) op-
eration, and 3) dissolution (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2003). Table 2 summarises four
suggestions for a more detailed model of a VO life cycle, which differ mainly in the terminology
for the creation phase. In addition, Goranson (1995) has suggested that the possible reconﬁgura-
tion of the VO should be considered as a part of the life cycle. Camarinha-Matos et al. (2003)
call this fourth phase the evolution. In what follows, we focus on the creation phase, although our
results can be partly extended to the reconﬁguration phase as well.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 highlights steps in the VBE-based VO life cycle and links them to the three managerial
roles of the VBE. The marketer of the VBE is often called the Broker (e.g. Bremer et al., 2001;
Katzy and Dissel, 2001), although the identiﬁcation of business opportunities need not be restricted
to a single entity; in effect, all VBE members can act as brokers (Figure 1a). Business opportunities
can be identiﬁed through various activities, for instance by monitoring calls for bids from potential
customers.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
A Coordinator is selected (Figure 1b) when the Broker and the Customer have reached a satisfac-
tory common understanding of the Customer’s needs. The Coordinator is charged with the task of
ﬁnding a set of partners whose competencies allow these needs to be met efﬁciently. Earlier on, it
has been suggested that the Broker selects the VO partners (e.g. Bremer et al., 2001). For the sake
6of generality, however, we distinguish between the roles of the Broker and the Coordinator, in the
understanding that these two roles can be performed by the same entity.
In the selection of VO partners, the Coordinator solicits bids from VBE members and possibly use
available databases to obtain information on partner candidates, too (Figure 1c). This possibility
is, in fact, one of the main advantages of the VBE in VO creation, because the repeated creation
of VOs from a relatively stable set of members makes it possible to collect information on past
collaboration. As a result, the VBE is better prepared to create VOs, because the Coordinator can
employ the intensity of past collaboration as an explicit selection criterion, for instance (Figure 1d).
Lavraˇ c et al. (2005) suggest that such collaboration can foster inter-organisational trust, which is
often regarded as a critical success factor of organisational collaboration (e.g. Ring and Van de
Ven, 1994; Thoben and Jagdev, 2001; Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2003).
The Coordinator should develop several suggestions for the VO conﬁguration, which are then
discussed with the Customer (Figure 1d). The proposed conﬁgurations should be Pareto-efﬁcient
inthesensethattherearenootherconﬁgurationswhichwouldperformequallywellonallselection
criteria and better on some criteria (see, e.g. Steuer, 1976). In particular, the Coordinator seeks to
identify an efﬁcient conﬁguration which also reﬂects the Customer’s preferences for the fulﬁlment
of multiple selection criteria. This last phase of VO partner selection is often carried out in close
collaboration with the Customer.
If the Customer assigns the project to the VBE, the selected VO starts its operation under the con-
trol of the Project Manager. Apart from normal project management duties, the Project Manager is
also responsible for reconﬁguring the VO, if this should be necessary (Figure 1e). At the comple-
tion of the project, the VO dissolves and databases on VBE collaboration history and other relevant
facts are updated for future use (Figure 1f).
73.2 A Preliminary Example
Realistic partner-selection problems may include dozens of partner candidates. For the sake of
clarity, we ﬁrst consider a smaller a problem with four partner candidates M = {1,2,3,4} and
a project with three tasks N = {1,2,3}. The estimated workloads of these tasks are 3, 5, and 2
person months (pm), respectively: the total workload of the project is therefore 10 pm. Each task
requires a speciﬁc competence, whereupon the candidates’ competences and task-speciﬁc variable
costs (e/pm) are shown in Table 3. There is a ﬁxed cost of 20 eper every partner that enters the
VO, and an additional ﬁxed cost of 20 eper each partner that works on a speciﬁc task.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In view of Table 3, Candidate 2 can be expected to offer the needed 5 pm of available capacity for
Task2. However, theselectionofCandidate2isariskydecision, becausethereisa30%probability
that its capacity drops to zero. In this case the consortium would have to ﬁnd a substitute partner,
which would engender higher costs.
In this example, there is a need to transport of 5 units of material between the partners that perform
Tasks 1 and 3. If Tasks 1 and 3 are assigned to the same partner, no physical transportation is
needed. The cost per unit of transportation between candidate partners is shown in the graph in
Figure 2a.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Some candidate partners have collaborated successfully in earlier projects. Such a successful col-
laboration history is an advantage, because the partners are familiar with each other’s manner of
working and more likely to have developed a high degree of mutual trust. Here, we assume that
Candidates 2 and 3 have participated in one joint project and Candidates 3 and 4 have collaborated
8in two earlier projects (Figure 2b).
The problem is to select a good VO conﬁguration for performing the project, subject to the above
information on the project and candidate partners. This problem is essentially that of allocating
the task workloads to partners, in recognition of their capacities and the decision criteria that
are relevant to the evaluation of alternative partner conﬁgurations. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
following three criteria:
1. minimisation of total costs (which comprise variable, ﬁxed, and transportation costs),
2. minimisation of risks due to possible capacity shortfalls,
3. maximisation of beneﬁts from inter-organisational dependencies (which are based on the
earlier collaboration history).
We now begin the formulation of an optimisation framework for this problem.
4 A Model of Collaboration
In what follows, VO partner selection is treated as a work-allocation problem for which we develop
a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model. Sections 4.1-4.3 present our basic model.
Sections 4.4-4.6 extend this model by considering transportation costs, risk metrics, and inter-
organisational dependencies.
94.1 Parameters and Variables
Let M = {1,...,m} denote the set of candidate partners in the VBE. At the outset, the VBE iden-
tiﬁes a business opportunity which is to be addressed by carrying out a project for the Customer.
The project tasks are denoted by N = {1,...,n}, and task j ∈ N involves a workload wj which
is measured in relevant units (e.g. person months).
The following parameters are collected from the candidates and relevant databases
Ci,j = a random variable which describes the capacity (i.e., amount of work) that candidate i can
perform on task j (e.g. person months)
pi,j = probability distribution function over the random variable Ci,j
vi,j = variable costs of candidate i working on task j (e.g. e/person month),
fi = ﬁxed cost of introducing candidate i into the VO,
fi,j = ﬁxed cost of candidate i starting to work on task j.
In our model, the capacity information is given as discrete probability distributions. In what fol-
lows, ck
i,j denotes the kth element of Ci,j and pi,j(k) is the corresponding probability. Without loss
of generality, it can be assumed that ck
i,js are sorted in descending order so that c1
i,j = maxk ck
i,j.
The probabilities sum up to one, i.e.,
P
k pi,j(k) = 1. Thus, the expected capacity that candidate i
devotes to task j is
E[Ci,j] =
X
k
pi,j(k)c
k
i,j ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N.
10The decision variable is the work-allocation matrix Xm×n whose element xi,j denotes the amount
of work that candidate i performs on task j. In order to formulate our MILP model, we deﬁne the
following auxiliary variables based on these x’s. Let
yi =

 
 
0, if xi,j = 0 ∀ j ∈ N
1, if xi,j > 0 for at least one j ∈ N.
In other words, yi is equal to one if and only if candidate i performs some work in the project, and
zero otherwise. Also, let
yi,j =

 
 
0, if xi,j = 0
1, if xi,j > 0.
Thus, yi,j indicates whether or not some work on task j is allocated to candidate i.
4.2 Objective Function
Our basic model has a single cost criterion which accounts for the candidates’ variable and ﬁxed
costs, i.e.,
min
X,Y cost(X,Y ) =
m X
i=1
fiyi
| {z }
(I)
+
n X
j=1
m X
i=1
(vi,jxi,j + fi,jyi,j)
| {z }
(II)
, (1)
where the matrix Xm×n contains the xs and the matrix Ym×(n+1) contains the ys. In the objective
function, the ﬁrst term (I) is the sum of ﬁxed costs due to the addition of partners to the VO, while
the second term (II) covers the ﬁxed and variable costs due to the work that the partners perform
on their respective tasks. This function is ﬂexible in that some costs can be ignored if they are
irrelevant.
114.3 Constraints
The two types of constraints in the optimisation problem ensure that all project demands are met,
and that the optimal solution is feasible.
Starting with project constraints, the workload of each task has to be completed, i.e.,
m X
i=1
xi,j ≥ wj ∀ j ∈ N. (2)
Furthermore, the workload that is allocated to a candidate must not exceed its maximum capacity:
xi,j ≤ c
1
i,j ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N.
Because the partner may not be able to devote its maximum capacity to the task, a less risky
approach is to constrain the workload by the partner’s expected capacity so that xi,j ≤ E[Ci,j]
(we shall address capacity risks at greater length in Section 4.5). Finally, workloads must be non-
negative:
xi,j ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N.
Continuing with feasibility constraints, correct values for binary yi’s are ensured by the following
constraints:
yi ≥
P
j∈N xi,j
P
j∈N wj
−  and yi ≤
P
j∈N xi,j
P
j∈N wj
−  + 1 ∀ i ∈ M. (3)
Here, the numerators denote the total amount of work that is allocated to candidate i while the
denominator is the total workload of the project: thus, these quotients are equal the proportion of
12the projects’ workload that is allocated to candidate i. Furthermore,  corresponds to the proportion
of the total workload that a candidate has to exceed in order to be considered a relevant VO partner.
In consequence, yi = 1 if at least ×100 percent of the projects’ workload is allocated to candidate
i, and yi = 0 otherwise.
The following constraints ensure that the binary yi,j’s assume correct values:
yi,j ≥
xi,j
c1
i,j
, ∀ i ∈ M,j ∈ N s.t. c
1
i,j > 0. (4)
That is, yi,j = 1 if at least some work of task j is allocated to candidate i, and yi,j = 0 otherwise.
No upper constraint for yi,j’s is needed, because increasing these binary variables from zero to one
results in higher total costs, meaning that the yi,j’s remain at zero level if this is feasible. However,
if one introduces additional decision criteria such that the beneﬁt increases when yi,j = 1, then an
upper bound similar to that for yi’s becomes necessary.
In summary, our basic optimisation model can now be stated as
min
X,Y cost(X,Y ) =
m X
i=1
fiyi +
n X
j=1
m X
i=1
(vi,jxi,j + fi,jyi,j)
s.t.
m X
i=1
xi,j ≥ wj ∀ j ∈ N
xi,j ≤ c
1
i,j ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N
yi ≥
P
j∈N xi,j
P
j∈N wj
−  ∀ i ∈ M
yi ≤
P
j∈N xi,j
P
j∈N wj
−  + 1 ∀ i ∈ M
yi,j ≥
xi,j
c1
i,j
, ∀ i ∈ M,j ∈ N s.t. c
1
i,j > 0
xi,j ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N
yi ∈ {0,1} ∀ i ∈ M
yi,j ∈ {0,1} ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N.
134.4 Transportation Costs
We begin our discussion of transportation costs with the following example of an existing VBE,
presented by the CeBeNetwork GmbH1. CeBeNetwork is a “strategic supplier” for Airbus, with
numerous projects in areas such as aerodynamics R&D, wind-tunnel testing, and IT systems de-
velopment for aircrafts. For instance, an IT project typically involves both software and hardware
solutions. The development of software does not involve transportation needs, but hardware equip-
ment must be transported from the manufacturing site of CeBeNetwork to the Airbus manufactur-
ing site.
In general terms, we consider a manufacturing VO where each partner supplies a speciﬁc compo-
nent which is part of the end-product. At each point of the manufacturing process where two or
more components are assembled together, these components obviously must be at the same site.
In consequence, the components must be transported to the assembly site, if the assembly does not
take place at the same site where the components are manufactured.
Transportationcostsarecausedmainlybytwofactors, 1)geographicaldistanceand2)volume/weight
of the cargo. For instance, it may be possible to compensate the cheaper labour costs of a far-away
manufacturing site by the lower transportation costs from a near-by site. Thus, the operational
costs discussed in Section 4.2 must be augmented by considering transportation costs, too. This
can be achieved only by explicating the sequence of tasks that are involved in the assembly of the
physical product.
For instance, in our preliminary example (see Section 3.2) the output of 5 transportation units from
Task 1 must be made available to the same site where Task 3 is carried out. The corresponding
task sequence can be illustrated with the simple network of Figure 3a. Because Task 2 does not
have physical connection to Tasks 1 or 3, it is shown as a disconnected node. For instance, Task 1
1See www.cebenetwork.com
14could correspond to the manufacturing of a microchip, which is assembled into the end-product in
Task 3. Task 2, in turn, could denote software development for the end-product.
Figure 3b re-illustrates the unit transportation costs between the partner candidates in our example.
Figure 3c integrates the information of Figures 3a and 3b, as well as information about which can-
didates can perform the corresponding tasks. Table 3a indicates that Candidates 1 and 3 are capable
of performing Task 1, while Task 3 can be performed by Candidates 1 and 4. Thus, depending on
the work allocation of Tasks 1 and 3, the transportation costs are as shown in Figure 3c.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The above concepts can be formalised as follows. Let r = (r0,r00) denote a pair of tasks such
that the (physical) output of task r0 must be at the same location where task r00 is carried out
(see Figure 3a). Let R denote the set of all such pairs. For each (r0,r00) ∈ R, let δr0,r00 be the
corresponding output volume of task r0 (measured in a relevant unit, e.g. kg). For instance, in the
example of Figure 3, R consists of one pair only, namely (1,3), with the volume of δ1,3 = 5.
Theunitcostoftransportationcanbepresentedasagraphwhosenodescorrespondtothecandidate
partners and whose edges represent the unit transportation costs between the adjacent nodes (see
Figure 3b); speciﬁcally, for candidates a and b, these unit costs are denoted by ta,b. In Figure 3b,
for instance, we have t1,4 = 6.
For each pair (r0,r00) ∈ R, we have two sets of candidates, that is the candidates that are capable of
performing task r0 and those that are capable of performing task r00 (see Figure 3c). These two sets
are connected by edges between the candidates, such that each edge represents the transportation
cost from one candidate to another, in accordance with the relation (r0,r00). For instance, in our
example, if Candidate 1 were to perform Task 1 and Candidate 4 were to perform Task 4, the
transportation costs would be 5 × 6 = 30, because δ1,3 = 5 and t1,4 = 6.
15Transportation costs can now be incorporated into our MILP model as follows. For any given pair
of tasks r = (r0,r00), we deﬁne the binary variable zr
a,b
z
r
a,b =

 
 
0, if ya,r0 = 0 or yb,r00 = 0
1, if ya,r0 = 1 and yb,r00 = 1
∀ r ∈ R, a,b ∈ M s.t. c
1
a,r0 ≥ wr0 and c
1
b,r00 ≥ wr00,
where this deﬁnition applies for all pairs of candidates a,b such that a is capable of performing
task r0 and b can perform task r00. Thus, zr
a,b is one if tasks r0 and r00 are enabled by transportation
between candidates a and b; otherwise zr
a,b is zero. In addition, the following constraints are
needed:
z
r
a,b ≤
ya,r0 + yb,r00
2
and z
r
a,b ≥ ya,r0 + yb,r00 − 1. (5)
The former constraint ensures that zr
a,b is zero if tasks r0 and r00 are not allocated to candidates a
and b, respectively. The latter constraint, in turn, ensures that zr
a,b is one if candidates a and b work
on tasks r0 and r00, respectively.
The total transportation costs can now be written as
cost
TRANS =
X
r∈R
δr0,r00ta,bz
r
a,b.
This cost function is linear, and thus the objective function (1) remains linear even when trans-
portation costs are accounted for.
164.5 Capacity Risk
Risk management activities are vital due to the possibly adverse impact of uncertainties in the
partners’ individual or collaborative behaviour (Cousins, 2002). Hallikas et al. (2004) suggest that
there are two main sources of uncertainties, namely demand and delivery. Because the VO partner
selection process is triggered by a business opportunity – or realised demand – demand risks are
largely beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore focus on delivery risks and address them
through capacity ﬂuctuations.
In Section 4.1, capacities were speciﬁed as discrete probability distributions. Several reasons sug-
gest that this level of accuracy is often sufﬁcient. First, small capacity ﬂuctuations do not usually
matter, because organisations can adapt themselves to such ﬂuctuations; thus, the decision-maker
(DM) is interested in large ﬂuctuations that may call for the reconﬁguration of the VO. Second, the
ex ante assessment of minor ﬂuctuations is difﬁcult, which means that the DM may have to accept
rough risk estimates (Hallikas et al., 2004). A discrete distribution is sufﬁcient for this purpose.
The management of capacity risks calls for a risk measure. Among alternative measures, expected
downside risk (EDR), introduced by Eppen et al. (1989) for capacity-risk management, is suitable
for our purposes, largely because it can be interpreted as the expected shortfall from the given
target value (in our case the allocated work). Recently, EDR has also been adopted in the context
of investment portfolio optimisation (Gustafsson and Salo, 2005). This measure belongs to the
family of mean-risk dominance models (Eppen et al., 1989; Fishburn, 1977) which are discussed
at some length in Gustafsson and Salo (2005).
Arguably, it is more meaningful to measure capacity risk as the expected shortfall from a target
value or – more speciﬁcally in our case – the allocated workload. This is because variance-based
measures indicate ‘risk’ whenever there are capacity uncertainties; yet, if the capacity varies well
above the required level, the DM is not really faced with risks. Thus, variance-based risk measures
17would be misleading.
In our model, the EDR of Candidate i’s work allocation on task j is
ρ
EDR
i,j =
X
k
ck
i,j<xi,j
pi,j(k)(xi,j − c
k
i,j).
That is, ρEDR
i,j is the expected value of downside difference between the amount of work on task j
that is allocated to Candidate i, on one hand, and i’s capacity on this task, on the other hand. The
summation is taken over those events ck
i,j that would result in capacity shortfall, subject to the
allocation of workload xi,j.
In order to incorporate EDR into our model, let c
k+
i,j ≥ 0 and c
k−
i,j ≥ 0, denote the positive and
negative difference of ck
i,j −xi,j for any given ck
i,j ∈ Ci,j. The correct values of c
k+
i,j and c
k−
i,j can be
ensured with constraints:
xi,j − c
k−
i,j + c
k+
i,j = c
k
i,j ∀ i ∈ M, j ∈ N, c
k
i,j ∈ Ci,j.
The formula for EDR becomes
ρ
EDR
i,j =
X
k
pi,j(k)c
k−
i,j ,
where the summation is taken over the probability distribution pi,j(k). However, only capacity
realisations below the target level contribute to the risk measure, because c
k−
i,j s are equal to zero
otherwise. The total EDR of a VO conﬁguration can thus be expressed as the sum
P
i
P
j ρEDR
i,j .
Risk management based on EDR can be captured by our MILP model either through goal program-
ming (e.g. through linear constraints such as ρEDR
i,j ≤ EDRmax) or through a value function that
18relates risks to costs. These approaches require parameter estimates, either in terms of accepted
risk-levels (EDRmax) or through the explication of tradeoffs between cost and capacity risk. From
the dynamic perspective, if the project involves tasks whose completion is crucial to the comple-
tion of several other tasks, such tasks can be weighted more heavily in the model formulation: for
example, one can associate lower accepted risk-levels or higher cost-of-risk with critical tasks.
4.6 Collaboration Efﬁciency
The measurement of inter-organisational performance is more viable in the management of VBE
than in an “open universe” of organisations. This is because the VBE members collaborate re-
peatedly, which permits the collection of data about inter-organisational performance. Thus, con-
siderations such as trust, success of past collaboration, and congruence between organisational
culture and objectives can be employed as potentially useful criteria for VO partner selection in
a VBE (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2003). These criteria can be referred to as network
preparedness criteria.
These preparedness criteria differ from traditional selection criteria (e.g. cost or quality) in that
they involve two or more organisations, while the ‘traditional’ criteria are usually applicable to a
single organisation (Jarimo et al., 2005). The consideration of transportation costs in the preceding
section, for instance, serves to highlight inter-organisational dependencies, because these costs
depend on pairs of candidates at a time.
Network relations are commonly described through graphs where edges represent interrelation-
ships between organisational pairs (see e.g. Pearson et al., 2002). For instance, Figure 4 illus-
trates collaboration patterns among twenty randomly selected companies in an existing VBE, the
Virtuelle Fabrik AG2 (company names are replaced with numbers). The varying thickness of edges
2See http://www.virtuelle-fabrik.com
19indicates the bilateral cooperation index, which assumes values in the range 0-3 (zero stands for no
earlier collaboration, three for intense collaboration). In the case of Virtuelle Fabrik, these values
were assessed by an expert.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
In order to incorporate inter-organisational dependencies into our model, we deﬁne a binary vari-
able za,b ∈ {0,1} which indicates whether or not a particular pair of candidates is selected into the
VO. Formally, we let
za,b =

 
 
0, if ya = 0 or yb = 0
1, if ya = 1 and yb = 1.
In other words, za,b is one if some work is allocated to both candidates a and b, and zero if work is
allocated to neither candidate or only one of them. This variable permits the modelling of bilateral
relations, of which the bilateral cooperation index in Figure 4 is but one example.
For z, we need the following constraints:
za,b ≤
ya + yb
2
and za,b ≥ ya + yb − 1 ∀ {a,b} ⊂ M, (6)
The former constraint ensures that za,b is strictly less than one if either ya or yb is zero, while the
latter ensures that za,b is one if both ya and yb are equal to one.
When the VBE has a documented collaboration history, the following linear measure can be used
to approximate the beneﬁts that accrue from earlier collaboration:
γ
LIN(Z) =
X
a,b∈M
a<b
ea,bza,b.
20Here Z is the m × m matrix of zs and ea,b represents the bilateral cooperation index between a
and b.
In general, the main use of collaboration data is to help determine which subsets of a VBE have
a higher expected collaboration efﬁciency, in view of the earlier track record of more or less suc-
cessful collaboration activities. This, and other network preparedness criteria such as geographical
distance, can be incorporated into our MILP model using the z variables.
4.7 Multi-criteria Analysis
In our optimisation framework, we outlined three selection criteria for the VO conﬁguration,
namely 1) minimise total costs, 2) minimise capacity risk, and 3) maximise expected collaboration
efﬁciency. We have also proposed a linear measure for each objective; however, these measures
are not commensurate, wherefore the DM needs to somehow consider these multiple objectives
explicitly.
First, the DM can employ goal-programming. Here, one of the objectives is typically optimised
while the other objectives are constrained to perform at some satisfactory level. Implicitly, we
have already done this when requiring that the task workloads much be fulﬁlled (see 2): that is,
the completion of the project is so important that no tradeoffs against other criteria are allowed. If
all target levels can not be reached simultaneously, then the DM may wish to minimise the total
deviation from target levels. (e.g. Taha, 1997)
Second, the DM can aggregate the different objectives by way of a subjective value function which
reﬂects his or her preferences for the relative importance of the selection criteria (see, e.g. Keeney
and Raiffa, 1993). These preferences are typically captured through criteria weights, which can
be elicited using systematic approaches (e.g. SMART (Edwards, 1977), SWING (von Winterfeldt
21and Edwards, 1986), SMARTS or SMARTER (Barron and Edwards, 1994)).
The DM may also be interested in the range of scores that different VO conﬁgurations can assume
with regard to each criterion. In our model, the best and worst possible scores can be determined by
replacing the inequalities in the work allocation constraints (2) with equalities, and by determining
the minima and maxima of the corresponding LP relaxation problems with regard to a single
criterion at a time. The ranges on the different criteria can be scaled so that the scores assume
values in equal intervals, e.g. [0,1] or [0,100].
Consequently, the value of a VO conﬁguration to the DM is the weighted sum of scores on each
criterion, where the weights correspond to the DM’s preferences. Since such an additive value
function is linear, it can be readily maximised using the suggested MILP framework.
5 Analysis of the Numerical Example
In Section 3.2 we initialised a numerical VO partner selection problem with three criteria, namely
1) minimise costs, 2) minimise risks, and 3) maximise expected collaboration efﬁciency. In the
following, we analyse the example using the MILP framework introduced in Section 4, and a
value-function approach to cope with the multiple criteria.
First, the best and worst possible scores on the three criteria are determined through solving the LP
relaxation problem as discussed in Section 4.7. Consequently, we obtain the following extremes:
cost∗ = 957 ρEDR
∗ = 0 γLIN
∗ = 3
cost0 = 1258 ρEDR
0 = 1.5 γLIN
0 = 0,
where ·∗ and ·0 refer to the best and worst possible scores, respectively. Here, it is intuitively
22clear that for instance the scores ρEDR
∗ and ρEDR
0 represent the two cases where ﬁrst, no work of
Task 2 is allocated to the risky Candidate 2 and second, all the work of Task 2 is allocated to
Candidate 2. Furthermore, score γLIN
∗ implies that all the candidates that have collaborated earlier,
i.e. candidates 2, 3, and 4 (see Figure 2b), are selected into the VO. Correspondingly, γLIN
0 implies
that Candidate 3 is not selected together with Candidates 2 or 4.
Assume, the DM states that the minimisation of costs is more important than the maximisation
of expected collaboration efﬁciency. In consequence, the following three criterion rank-orders are
possible:
Criterion Rank
Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3:
min costs 1. 1. 2.
min risks 2. 3. 1.
max collaboration 3. 2. 3.
In Table 4 we have calculated the corresponding criterion weights using the SMARTER (Barron
and Edwards, 1994) method. Moreover, Table 4 shows the suggested work-allocation and the
corresponding criterion scores and the aggregate value in the three preference scenarios, calculated
using our MILP model. Here, the best and worst scores imply the values of 1 and 0, respectively.
Hence, also the aggregate value of a conﬁguration is between zero and one. With the current
preference information, it seems, there exists only one robust choice, namely at least 1.5 pm of
Task 2 is always allocated to Candidate 4. Therefore, more information on the DM’s preferences
is needed. The analysis can, however, be used as an initial position for negotiations.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Another way to explore the Pareto-efﬁcient conﬁgurations is to go through a large number of
different preference scenarios. For the sake of illustration, we calculated the optimal conﬁgurations
23using a grid of weights, where the weights ranged between zero and one at intervals of 0.1. By
this means, we found ﬁve Pareto-efﬁcient conﬁgurations, depicted in Figure 5, including the three
presented in Table 4.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
With three criteria and intervals of α, there exist 1+3α+2α2
2α2 points in the grid. If α = 0.1 there
exist 66 points in the grid, hence exploring Pareto-efﬁcient conﬁgurations by this way can be ex-
tremely time consuming. In addition, not necessarily all Pareto-efﬁcient conﬁgurations are found.
6 Discussion
6.1 Computational Tractability
The computational tractability of a MILP model deteriorates with the number of integer variables.
It is therefore of interest to determine how many integer variables and constraints the model con-
tains (see Tables 5 and 6). Here, we have assumed that there are n tasks and for each task there are
m0 candidate partners. Moreover, each partner is a candidate for exactly one task, which results in
the total number of m0 × n = m candidates. Lastly, we have assumed that each task involves a
transportation link to another task. These assumptions result in the calculated upper bound for the
size of a model with m candidates and n tasks (Tables 5 and 6).
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
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24Table 7 gives upper bounds for model size in several cases. In our experiments, the models in-
dicated in boldface took more than an hour to solve, those underlined required less than half an
hour, while the others took less than a minute on a normal Linux machine (2.4 GHz Intel Celeron
processor and 1 GB of memory). The optimisations were carried out with the lp_solve3 software
from MATLAB. These results suggest that approximative solution algorithms may be needed for
large models.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
First and foremost, the model size depends on the number of za,b variables and related constraints.
These variables are used, for instance, for describing the earlier collaboration history of VBE
members: thus, if each VBE member has collaborated with every other VBE member, then the
graph describing collaboration history is complete and the number of za,b variables is equal to the
number of edges in the complete collaboration graph. However, as suggested by Virtuelle Fabrik
example, the collaboration graph is seldom complete (Figure 4). While a complete graph for the
twenty organisations in this example would include (202−20)/2 = 190 edges, collaboration seems
to occur only between 34 pairs out of the maximum 190. In consequence, the average degree of a
node in the Virtuelle Fabrik graph is 2×34/20 = 3.4. If we assume an average collaboration-graph
degree of 4 with n = m0 = 10, the total number of integer variables is only 1300 integer variables
instead of the maximum 6050. This leads to a dramatically smaller computation time.
Efﬁcient exact algorithms for the determination of non-dominated VO conﬁgurations would be
of considerable interest. In effect, the identiﬁcation of the best set of VO partners is essentially
a multi-criteria portfolio selection problem with inter-organisational dependencies, because the
partners can work on multiple tasks while several partners can work on the same task. This analogy
suggests that recent advances of project portfolio selection hold considerable potential for VO
partner selection, too (e.g. Liesiö et al., 2005).
3Available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/lp_solve/
25However, some complications are caused by the fact that the feasibility of alternative solutions
depends on different considerations. In VO partner selection, a VO conﬁguration is feasible if the
partners’ competences match customer needs; in particular, the removal of a partner may result in
an infeasible conﬁguration. In most resource-constrained portfolio selection problems, however,
the elimination of a project from a feasible portfolio does not usually result in infeasibility (see, e.g.
Liesiö et al., 2005). Thus, portfolio selection methods cannot be applied to VO partner selection
in a straightforward way, although they hold potential in this context, too.
6.2 Additional Features
The MILP model can be extended through further additions and modiﬁcations. Common capacity
between several tasks can be captured through an additional constraint such as xi,a + xi,b ≤ ci,ab.
Cardinality constraints on the number of organisations that may take part in performing some
task can be modelled through binary variables: for instance, if task j denotes project management
activities that must be performed by a single organisation, we add the constraint
P
i yi,j = 1.
Overworkpricingiscapturedwithanewvariablex
+
i,j whichdenotesworkthatexceedsthecapacity
c1
i,j. The capacity constraint now consists of two equalities, xi,j − x
+
i,j ≤ c1
i,j and x
+
i,j ≤ c
1+
i,j , of
which the latter one puts an upper bound for the amount of overwork. The cost function takes an
additional term v
+
i,jx
+
i,j, where v
+
i,j is the marginal variable cost of overwork.
Capacity transfer between the members of the VBE can be modelled through the variable ∆
j
a,b,
which denotes the transfer of capacity from a to b in relation to task j. Moreover, every ck
a,j in the
constraints must be replaced by ck
a,j−∆
j
a,b, and every ck
b,j by ck
b,j+∆
j
a,b. The possibility of capacity
transfers opens up exciting possibilities for hedging against capacity risk by using capacity option-
contracts.
26Additional selection criteria which pertain to a single partner can be captured using the binary yi
variables; these criteria may cover aspects such as quality of outputs or ﬁnancial status of the part-
ner. For instance, if qi denotes the quality level of candidate i, the quality of a VO conﬁguration can
be approximated by the sum
P
i qiyi. Furthermore, additional criteria that rely on the comparison
of two partners can be captured by introducing binary variables, analogously to consideration of
the collaboration history in Section 4.6.
7 Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper, we have developed several multi-criteria optimisation models for the VO partner-
selection problem in a VBE. Our models are realistic, because they allow the DM to apply sev-
eral selection criteria and to analyse these by using goal programming or by developing an ad-
ditive value function, for instance (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993). In particular, these models differ
from earlier contributions in that they consider explicitly the risk of VO failures and also inter-
organisational dependencies due to an earlier collaboration history. Thus, they can provide the
foundation for the development of decision support systems which assist the DM in evaluating
alternative VO conﬁgurations. Such systems can be highly useful when the DM seeks to identify
Pareto-efﬁcient VO conﬁgurations, even if it is unlikely that the selection of VO partners could be
fully automated by relegating it to an optimisation model.
Because the very purpose of a VBE is to support the creation of VOs from a relatively stable set
of members, it is well positioned to collect data on its members. This also makes it possible to
consider additional selection criteria in VO conﬁguration and, in particular, to account for aspects
such as earlier collaboration history, degree of mutual trust, or similarity of ICT infrastructures.
Numerical parameters on these aspects can be obtained by making use of accumulated databases,
by soliciting expert opinions, or by collecting bids from candidate partners.
27This research suggests several promising topics for future research. First, the identiﬁcation of
substitute partners for the purpose of hedging against capacity risk can be of considerable value,
and could be implemented through capacity option-contracts (e.g. Kamrad and Siddique, 2004;
Martínez-de-Albéniz and Simchi-Levi, 2005). Second, because it may be difﬁcult or prohibitively
expensive to acquire complete information about all the relevant parameters (e.g. characteristics of
candidatepartners, DM’spreferencesfortheevaluationcriteria), preferenceprogrammingmethods
(Salo and Hämäläinen, 2004) which deal with incomplete information explicitly may be useful in
VO creation, too. Third, efﬁcient algorithms and heuristic approximative approaches for ﬁnding
the set of Pareto-efﬁcient VO conﬁgurations would be highly useful. Here, the recently developed
Robust Portfolio Modelling method is a potentially promising approach (Liesiö et al., 2005).
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33a) A business opportunity is identiﬁed b) A Coordinator is selected
c) Coordinator gathers information d) Coordinator selects VO partners
e) VO Manager controls operation f) VO dissolves, databases are updated
Figure 1: Some Steps in the VO Life cycle and Related Roles
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Figure 3: An Example of Transportation Parameters
35Figure 4: The Collaboration Intensity of Twenty Companies of Virtuelle Fabrik AG
36Figure 5: Five Pareto-efﬁcient Conﬁgurations
37Table 1: Earlier Optimisation Approaches to Partner Selection
Problem Formulation Selection Criteria Context
Authors CO IO FR MC TI
Mathematical Programming
Boon and Sierksma (2003) X ST
Degraeve and Roodhooft (2000) X T SC
Ip et al. (2004) X VE
Ko et al. (2001) X T VE
Mikhailov (2002) X VE
Sha and Che (2005) X VE
Non-linear Optimisation
Feng and Yamashiro (2003) X T X VE
Ip et al. (2003) X C VE
Lin and Chen (2004) X SC
Goal Programming
Hajidimitriou and Georgiou (2002) X JV
Talluri et al. (1999) X X X VE
Graph Theoretic
Fischer et al. (2004) X X VE
Wu and Su (2005) X C VE
Chance-constrained DEA
Talluri et al. (2006) X X SC
CO=costs, IO=inter-organisational dependencies, FR=failure risk,
MC=multiple criteria in general, TI=time
X=modelled as objective, C=modelled as constraint, T=only transportation costs
ST=sports team, SC=supply chain, VE=virtual enterprise, JV=joint venture
38Table 2: The Life cycle Phases of a VO (the scope of this paper is emphasised)
Goranson (1995) Kanet et al. (1999) Katzy and Dissel (2001) Tølle and Bernus (2003)
1)
Identiﬁcation Identiﬁcation Prephase Identiﬁcation
Partner Search Formation Conﬁguration
Concept
Requirements
Formation /
Design Design
Design
Commitment Implementation
2) Operation Operation Operation Operation
3)
Reconﬁgure /
Dissolution Disbandment Decommission
Dissolution
Table 3: Candidates’ Competences in Terms of Capacity and Cost
a) Candidates’ Capacities (pm) b) Candidates’ Costs (e/pm)
Task Task
Cand. 1 2 3 Cand. 1 2 3
1 3 - 2 1 63 - 75
2 - 5† - 2 - 101 -
3 3 - - 3 65 - -
4 - 5 2 4 - 121 90
† With probability 0.3 this capacity is 0.
39Table 4: Work Allocation, Scores, and Conﬁguration Value in Three Preference Scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Weights: 0.61, 0.28, 0.11 0.61, 0.11, 0.28 0.28, 0.61, 0.11
Task Task Task
Cand. 1 2 3 Cand. 1 2 3 Cand. 1 2 3
1 3 - 2 1 - - - 1 - - -
2 - - - 2 - 3.5 - 2 - - -
3 - - - 3 3 - - 3 3 - -
4 - 5 - 4 - 1.5 2 4 - 5 2
Scores: 1044, 0, 0 1055, 1.05, 3 1085, 0, 2
Value: 0.71 0.72 0.84
Table 5: Upper Bounds for the Number of Integer Variables
Variable # Variables Note
yi m0 × n One per each candidate
yi,j m0 × n One per each candidate
zr
a,b m02(n − 1) Number of edges in a complete bipartite graph
(m02) for each transportation requirement (n − 1).
za,b
1
2m0 × n(m0 × n − 1) Number of edges in a complete graph of m0 × n
nodes
Total ≤ 3
2m0 × n + 1
2(m0 × n)2 + m02(n − 1)
40Table 6: Upper Bounds for the Number of Integer Constraints
Constraint # Constraints Note
yi 2m0 × n See (3)
yi,j m0 × n See (4)
zr
a,b 2m02(n − 1) See (5)
za,b m0 × n(m0 × n − 1) See (6)
Total ≤ 2m0 × n + (m0 × n)2 + 2m02(n − 1)
Table 7: Numerical Upper Bounds for the Size of the Model
a) Number of Integer Variables
m0 \ n 2 4 6 8 10
2 18 56 110 180 266
4 60 200 404 672 1004
6 126 432 882 1476 2214
8 216 752 1544 2592 3896
10 330 1160 2390 4020 6050
b) Number of Integer Constraints
m0 \ n 2 4 6 8 10
2 32 104 208 344 512
4 112 384 784 1312 1968
6 240 840 1728 2904 4368
8 416 1472 3040 5120 7712
10 640 2280 4720 7960 12000
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